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EDUCATING MISSISSIPPI
The Honorable James L. Robertson*
In Memory of Roy D. Campbell, Jr., long-time President of the Board of
Trustees, Greenville Municipal Separate School District, and who gave his
all to preserve and promote public education in Mississippi.
I. READIN’, RIGHTIN’ AND ‘RITHMETIC –
GOING ON MISSISSIPPI’S THIRD CENTURY
Here follows a bit more than a once over lightly of one state’s
ongoing endeavors at equipping its people with the learning and
understanding they reasonably need that each may enjoy – in his or her
continued social existence on this increasingly complex planet – a bit richer
experience than their forbears had, to the end of a public order of human
dignity for all.
There is a sense in which our story begins at statehood, December
1817. And not necessarily in the schoolhouse. We have been taught by so
many worthy and enlightened men and women, one and all.
In 1818, at the very first term of the Supreme Court of Mississippi,
Judge Joshua Giles Clarke sufficiently understood the humanity of each
being on state soil – and of the law – that he decreed freedom for slaves
who had been sold down the River from southwestern Indiana.1 Judge
Clarke never had much formal schooling. Yet he found and taught a core
truth that by 1857 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney of the Supreme Court of
the United States could not understand.2
* James L. Robertson is a graduate of Harvard Law School, a former Justice
on the Supreme Court of Mississippi, author of Heroes, Rascals and the Law;
Constitutional Encounters in Mississippi History (2019); author of Constitutional Law, a
500 plus page exposition of Mississippi constitutional law and practice, Chapter 19,
Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law (Third Edition, 2020); and has been a citizen of
Mississippi since July 30, 1940. The author expresses his appreciation for the competent
and diligent assistance of James “Bud” Sheppard, Sonya Dickson, Seth Curren, Keeton
Thach, Melanie Mitchell, and Mississippi College School of Law Professor Donald
Campbell.
1. Harry and Others v. Decker & Hopkins, Walker (1 Miss.) 36, 1818
WL1235 (1818); see Robertson, Heroes, Rascals, and the Law; Constitutional
Encounters in Mississippi History, chapter 2 (2019).
2. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691, 1856 U.S.
Lexis 472, 1856 WL 8721 (1857).
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In 1950, Mississippi’s Nobel Laureate William Faulkner taught us
the insight that “the past is never dead. In fact, it’s not even past.”3 Most
of us have needed a schoolhouse and a good American lit teacher to get
through that one.
Dr. Arthur C. Guyton graduated from University High School in
Oxford in 1936, a teacher all of his life, primarily at the University of
Mississippi Medical School. In 1956, Dr. Guyton published his still widely
used Textbook of Medical Physiology.
Myres Smith McDougal was born in 1906 in rural Prentiss County.
By the time he passed into history, Mac had lit and illuminated “the guiding
light of a preferred future world public order of human dignity,”4 and even
introduced the polemics of Space Law to the University of Mississippi.
Ida B. Wells was a native of Holly Springs, Mississippi, an educator
and journalist who was a founding member of the N.A.A.C.P. and a
crusading teacher, railing against lynching, which for decades was a
scourge throughout much of the state.
Eudora Welty was a Pulitzer Prize winning author, with novels such
as The Optimist’s Daughter plus many short stories, still taught in
Mississippi’s schools and across the country.
And the list could go on and on.
No one can function effectively within today’s nuanced and
complex society without far more than basic competence in reading,
writing, and arithmetic. Or, for that matter, without knowing well what data
processing is all about. Reading newspapers and other publications is
important, but being able to understand instructions and regulations for this
activity or that is more important, if not crucial. Comprehending and
working with more than just simple arithmetic are necessary for everyday
consumer or other business transactions, accessible tax principles, rules of
the road, the delineation of landlines, and much, much more.
No informed person today doubts that knowledge is power.
“Informed,” that is, but at the very least, by a competent high school
education. Before one casts a vote for an important public office, he or she
should know and understand what it means that knowledge is power.5
The above persons and preliminary perspectives before us, this
endeavor into education in Mississippi begins with its Historical Context.
Each of the state’s four constitutions has addressed the matter of education
3. William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun 80 (1927).
4. W. Michael Reisman, et al., The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction,
32 YALE J. OF INT’L L. 575, 576 (2007),
5. See “Knowledge is Power,” in Yuval Noah Harari’s popular book, Sapiens
– A Brief History of Mankind, 259-264 (2015). Much of Harari’s book would serve well
as a text for an upper high school level course in world history.
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and its necessity for quality of life and enriching our understanding of
humanity. Free Public Schools have long been and remain the core
component and cornerstone of the state’s effort at fulfilling the
responsibility it has accepted for the education of its people.
Yet, the struggle continues. We must remain vigilant. We still have
to fight the good fight.
In 1997, the state established the Mississippi Adequate Education
Program (MAEP), which, with adjustments over time, still supplies the
framework for the state’s program for public education. An outline of
public education's financial dimensions follows, given that the practical
reality of inadequate financing imperils the whole system. More
particularly, several citizen-sponsored resorts to the constitutional and legal
system to achieve full funding came up short. These efforts that adequate
funding be provided remain important components of the history and future
of public education in Mississippi. Then twenty-one school districts
brought an important adequate funding suit, which in 2017, sadly and
arguably erroneously, was rejected by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
The Sixteenth Section School Lands Trust is described and
explained below. This was perhaps the earliest source of funding for free
public education in Mississippi. A misstep by federal land offices in 1832
impaired this program for many years. Other mismanagement has been
corrected so that this program is now of considerable value for the state’s
public schools. Section 206 of the state constitution authorizes local school
districts to make special assessments to support their educational endeavors
in a program that had to be righted by litigation in 2012.
Educational stratagems of more recent vintage go well beyond the
opportunities available to those Mississippi children born in the late
Twentieth Century. Most of these more current concerns are presented and
discussed below. These include charter schools and voucher systems.
Religion in Public Schools and related issues are presented and
discussed, followed by more secular considerations of LGBTQ issues.
Arguably, these should be considered together with racial desegregation
beginning in 1954 with Brown v. Board of Education,6 presented and
discussed in the latter part of the Historical Context section, which follows
below.
Finally, and arguably to come full circle, there is the comeback
being made by those parents who would home school their children. This
legislatively authorized practice is presented and discussed, along with
relevant regulations. Our end remains a preferred future world public order
of human dignity for each and all.
6. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, KS, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and 349 U.S.
294 (1955).
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II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT7
All four Mississippi constitutions have exalted the long-term
purpose and goal of a well-educated citizenry. Back in 1817, the State’s
original constitution-makers proclaimed that
Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good
government, the preservation of liberty, and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education, shall forever
be encouraged in this State.8
An identical clause appeared in the Jacksonian Democracy Constitution of
1832.9
The preambles to these constitutional aspirations were tempered by
identical freedom of religion clauses,10 hardly unfamiliar given the
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses in the First Amendment to the U.
S. Constitution, ratified on December 15, 1791. Of late, “religion” — that
first word in the education clauses of the first two state constitutions — has
taken a bit of a back seat among some, as people have become more secular,
or at least more accustomed to the removal of religious practices and
artifacts from public places, such as public schools.11 And, as well, from
public funding for sectarian entities and their activities.
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Mississippi accepted the public
policy premise that the right of each child to a “minimally adequate public
education” through and including high school “is one we can only label
fundamental.”12 It is not without significance that, when the legislature
7. See John Winkle’s, The Mississippi State Constitution 125-135 (2d ed.
2014), which provides a brief once-over-lightly of Miss. Const. art. VIII, Education, and
its history.
8. MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (1817). This wording is a slightly improved
version of Article 3 of the Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787. See City of Corinth v.
Robertson, 87 So. 464, 465 (Miss. 1921).
9. MISS. CONST. art. VII, § 14 (1832).
10. MISS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 4 (1817); MISS. CONST. Art. VI, §§ 3, 4 (1832).
11. See, e.g., Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (proscribing Christian and
other religious prayer in public schools); and Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (proscribing Bible reading in public schools). Still, there are those
who fight back, and cleverly so. See, e.g., the Mississippi Student Religious Liberties Act
of 2013. MISS. CODE §§ 37-12-1 thru -13. This new law seeks to implement the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, to the careful
avoidance of the lightning rod commands of the Establishment Clause.
12. See Hinds Cty. Sch. Dist. v. R. B. ex rel. D.L.B., 10 So. 3d 387, 399, 402
(¶¶ 31, 39) (Miss. 2009); Pascagoula Mun. Sch. Dist. v. T. H., 681 So. 2d 110, 114
(Miss. 1996); Clinton Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1985),
accepted in Uni. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Hughes, 765 So.2d 528, 539 (¶39) (Miss. 2000).
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enacted the Mississippi Accountability and Adequate Education Program
Act of 1997 [MAEP], “minimally” did not appear as a qualifier
immediately before “Adequate Education.”13
More broadly, promoting education has been a national priority
almost from day one in the life of the new nation, in its gradually growing
maturity and entirety. Support for public schools for many years was in
substantial part provided via revenues generated by—and uses afforded
by—sixteenth section lands, held by the State of Mississippi in trust, and
from statehood. The U. S. Congress so provided ab initio in the Northwest
Territory Ordinance of 1785,14 which reserved the centerpiece sixteenth
section, or 1/36th, of each township of public land, for the use and benefit
of public schools.15 Mississippi’s story has been complicated by what
happened regarding roughly the State’s northern 23 counties—more or less
from Coahoma County bordering The River on the west, to Monroe County
and thence to Alabama on the east, and northerly therefrom to the
Tennessee state line. In these areas, the U. S. Land Office neglected to hold
back the sixteenth sections when it sold off to the public the lands “ceded”
to the Jacksonian iteration of the federal government by the Chickasaw
Nation via the one-sided Treaty of Pontotoc Creek in October of 1832.16
At statehood in December of 1817, title to and control of the new
state’s sixteenth sections and other school lands were donated by and
otherwise derived from Georgia, whereupon—as noted—that title became
vested in the State of Mississippi, in trust for the use and benefit of the
respective counties.17 Local school authorities and school children have
13. MISSISSIPPI ACCOUNTABILITY AND ADEQUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM ACT
of 1997, Miss. Laws ch. 612, § 2 (1997), codified as MISS. CODE § 37-151-1, et seq.; see
particularly § 37-151-5(a).
14. See Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1785, 1 Laws of U. S. 565; the story
of the school lands trust is told in Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 267-75 (1986);
Papasan v. United States, 756 F.2d 1087, 1089-1091 (5th Cir. 1985); and Hill v.
Thompson, 564 So.2d 1, 4-7 (Miss. 1989).
15. This story is summarized in John Winkle’s, The Mississippi State
Constitution 131-133 (2d ed. 2014); with slightly varying versions told in Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 270-72 (1986); Turney v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Educ., 481 So. 2d
770, 783-85 (Miss. 1985); Bd. of Educ. of Lamar Cty. v. Hudson, 588 So. 2d 683, 68586 (Miss. 1991).
16. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 270-272, 294-295 (1986); City
of Corinth v. Robertson, 87 So. 464, 465-466 (Miss. 1921).
17. See MISS. CODE § 29-3-1, re local school board control of trust lands; see
also, e.g., Jones v. Madison Cty., 18 So. 87, 91 (Miss. 1895) (legal title vested in State of
Mississippi); Street v. City of Columbus, 23 So. 773, 774 (Miss. 1898) (same);
Robertson v. Monroe Cty., 79 So. 184, 185 (Miss. 1918) (“the State is therefore a
trustee”); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sunflower Cty., 87 So. 417 (Miss. 1921) (same);
Armstrong v. Jones, 170 So. 637, 640 (Miss. 1936); Bridgforth v. Middleton, 186 So.
837, 838 (Miss. 1939); Pilgrim v. Neshoba Cty., 40 So. 2d 598 (Miss. 1949) (lands here
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been the beneficiaries of the school lands trust but have never been its fee
simple title owners. This system and its title relationships remain, though
knowledgeable citizens recognize that far greater financial resources are
needed if we are to have only adequate public schools, Prekindergarten
(PK) through Twelfth (12th) grade.
In the course of postbellum Reconstruction, another new
constitution—Mississippi’s third—made extensive provisions for “a
uniform system of public schools.”18 With assorted twists and turns
because of perceived white supremacy and related racial considerations,
and—to a lesser extent—of religious considerations, there is a sense in
which this postbellum system of freely accessible pre-college public
schools exists to this day.
In the early days of statehood, the school year lasted only four
months.19 The reasons for this practice ranged from—on the one hand, the
expense of operating public schools for longer periods of time each year
to—on the other hand, the fact that the rural lifestyle of most Mississippians
made it necessary that older school-age children be available for farm labor,
both at planting in the spring of each year and at harvest in the fall.20 In
1912, communities with a population of at least 5000 people became
eligible to extend their school years to seven months.21 The minimum
public school year today is one hundred eighty (180) days in which the
school personnel and students must be in attendance for not less than sixtythree percent (63%) of the instructional day.22
Sadly, once Reconstruction had passed in the late 1870s, racial

involved conveyed in trust to the State of Mississippi); Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1,
5-6 (Miss. 1989); Morrow v. Vinson, 666 So. 2d 802, 805 (Miss. 1995); Miss. Gaming
Comm’n v. Bd. of Educ., of Harrison Cty., 691 So. 2d 452, 461 (Miss. 1997); Clark v.
Stephen D. Lee Foundation, 887 So. 2d 798, 803 (¶15) (Miss. 2004); see also, Simmons
v. Holmes, 49 Miss. 134, 144-45, 1873 WL 4145 (1873).
18. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1869); see Chrisman v. Mayor of Town of
Brookhaven, 12 So. 458, 459-60 (Miss. 1893).
19. “At least one school must be maintained in each school district for four
months in the year.” Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss. 758, 763, 1879 WL 4019 (1879); Bufkin
v. Mitchell, 63 So. 458, 460, 461 (Miss. 1913); Miller v. State ex rel. Russell, 94 So. 706,
708-09 (Miss. 1923); and Tunica Cty. v. Town of Tunica, 227 So. 3d 1007, 1024, 1034
(¶¶ 39, 72) (Miss. 2017).
20. Under the 1890 constitution as originally enacted, “agricultural
improvement” was one of the original goals of the free public schools. See, e.g., Morris
v. Vandiver, 145 So. 228, 229, 230-32 (Miss. 1933) (agricultural high school); State
Teachers’ College v. Morris, 144 So. 374, 376 (Miss. 1932); Bufkin v. Mitchell, 63 So.
458, 460, 462 (Miss. 1913).
21. Miss. Laws ch. 255 (1912); see Bufkin v. Mitchell, 63 So. 458, 459 (Miss.
1913).
22. MISS. CODE §§ 37-13-63, -151-5(j).
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segregation in public schools became a cruel fact of life in Mississippi,23
and in the American South in general. In 1960, and with white state leaders
fearful and determined to resist the probable effects of Brown v. Board of
Education (1954, 1955),24 the mandatory public school attendance
component of Section 201 was deleted from the state constitution.25 This,
of course, was at a time when, as a practical matter, not many African
American citizens were able to register and vote. It was not until 1987 that
the constitutional mandate for compulsory26 free public schools was
restored.27
In the aftermath of Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Education
28
(1969), the legislature quickly passed a statute outlawing racial
segregation in “any group, area, school, institution or other politic
subdivision of the State.”29 Little prescience was required to sense the
purpose and meaning of the next sentence of that new statute, viz., “There
shall be no governmentally enforced segregation by race, color or national
origin and there shall be no governmentally enforced integration by reason
of race, color or national origin.”30 Section 37-15-35 is still on the books,
though the latter clause is arguably a dead letter.
Of more practical consequence, and much more so than in the wake
of the Brown decisions, this state’s public schools became complemented
by ever-growing and increasing iterations of private, parochial, and more
23. See MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 207, repealed December 1978; Miss Laws,
ch. 587 (Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 557); see also references in Chrisman v.
Town of Brookhaven, 70 Miss. 477, 12 So. 458, 459-60 (1893) and Wyatt v. HarrisonStone-Jackson Agric. High Sch., 177 Miss. 13, 170 So. 526, 528 (1936).
24. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, KS, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and 349 U.S.
294 (1955). Alexander had followed Green v. Cty. School Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391
U.S. 430 (1968).
25. See Miss. Laws, ch. 547 (1960), formally inserted into the state
constitution on Nov. 23, 1960.
26. Many state laws advisedly use the phrase “compulsory-school-age child.”
See, e.g., MISS. CODE, §§ 37-13-91(2) (f); -(3), -(4), -(5), -(6), -(7); Lauderdale Cty. Sch.
Bd. v. Brown, 106 So.3d 807, 810, 811 (¶¶ 11, 12, 18) (Miss. 2013); L. W. v. McComb
Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 754 So.2d 1136, 1142 (¶ 25) (Miss. 1999); In Interest of T. H.,
III, 681 So. 2d 110, 116 (Miss. 1996); In Interest of R. G., 632 So. 2d 953, 955 (Miss.
1994).
27. See Miss. Laws, ch. 671 (1987) (House Concurrent Resolution No. 9),
formally inserted into the state constitution on Dec. 4, 1987.
28. Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). Prof. Dennis
J. Mitchell has told a more complete version of the Alexander saga in A New History of
Mississippi 469-470 (2014).
29. Miss. Laws, ch. 374 (1970), codified as MISS. CODE §37-15-35 (first
sentence).
30. Miss. Laws, ch. 374 (1970), codified as MISS. CODE §37-15-35 (second
sentence).
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recently other public Prekindergarten (PK) through Twelfth (12th) grade
levels of educational alternatives. The total enrollment for PK-12th grade
in Mississippi is 442,627.31 While approximately 51,000 Mississippi
children attend private schools of one variety or another32, and 25,376
children are homeschooling.33 Relatively few African American students
have ever attended these sectarian non-public schools. Consistent with the
racial makeups of their communities, PK-12 schooling—in its various
conglomerated iterations in the state today—has become almost as
segregated de facto as it was de jure in the days before Brown and its
Alexander mandate.
Charter schools are an alternative of recent interest.34 No doubt
some public charter schools have improved the educational experience of
some school children. Ostensibly intended to help underprivileged and
special needs children, however, it is doubtful one could find—in
Mississippi or much of anywhere else—a student moving to a charter
school that has a larger minority population than the conventional public
school that child would otherwise attend. The number of students attending
charter schools and their percentage among school age children in the state
remain relatively minuscule.35 Chronic lack of financial and quality human
resources has kept many Mississippi public schools mired in mediocrity.
The story of the Ayers case is important in the history of education
here. Regarding traditional racial practices in public college and university
classrooms, the 1992 Ayers ruling by the U. S. Supreme Court demanded
that the State dismantle the sources of such long practiced racial
segregation.36 With this constitutional precedent in place, the question has
become, whether—in the half century since Alexander—the sources of
racially discriminatory practices in PK-12 public schools have been
31. State Data Report, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (March 9,
2021 8:55 AM), https://newreports.mdek12.org.
32. Top Mississippi Private Schools, PRIVATE SCHOOL REVIEW (March 9, 2021
9:00 AM), https://www.privateschoolreview.com/mississippi#:~:text=For%20the%2020
21%20school%20year(view%20national%20tuition%20averages).
33. Brett Kittredge, Number of Homeschoolers in Mississippi Rises,
MISSISSIPPI CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY (March 9, 2021 9:10 AM), https://mspolicy.org/
number-of-homeschoolers-in-mississippirises/#:~:text=According%20to%20unofficial
%20data%20collected,is%20homeschooled%20by%20September%2015.
34. See Mississippi Charter Schools Act. MISS. CODE, §§ 37-28-1 thru 37-2861; see also, MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(v).
35. For the year 2019-20, some 2189 students were enrolled in Mississippi
charter schools, some .0046% of all school age children in the state with a substantial
mathematical increase over years past.
36. United States v. Ayers, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) and Ayers v. Thompson, 358
F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004) (finally and practicably dismantling the sources of substantial
racial discrimination in all of the State’s institutions of higher learning).
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dismantled. After all, in Ayers the State, with discerning and sensible
leadership, finally accepted the inevitable—and settled.
Fast forward a generation. A prime exemplar of the sort of state’s
data dilemma in the immediate future is whether other than traditional
educational stratagems—primarily private schools and homeschooling37—
will become an increasingly effective means38 by which the state continues
falling short of achieving, in reality, Alexander’s long term, full integration
mandate. This becomes a serious question of state constitutional law, given
the command of the second clause of Article III, § 7, viz., “nor shall any
law be passed in derogation of the paramount allegiance of the citizens of
this State to the government of the United States.”39
Mississippi’s “duty of paramount allegiance” extends to all issues
and contexts where “the citizens of this State” are subject to and bound by
the federal Supremacy Clause.40 Suffice it to say that the jury is still out on
whether—again only for an increasingly prominent exemplar—the Charter
School Act41 may in time become a release valve that allows the state to
evade its duties under Alexander. Its lessons thought learned and accepted
under Ayers, applied in the state’s free public schools. Put otherwise,
because the point is so essential, every school law that the state may enact
is subject to mandatory scrutiny for whether it has or preserves “substantial
discriminatory effects.”42 The question going forward is whether
Mississippi’s leadership will insist that—when it comes to the historic
constitutional goal of an educated and enlightened citizenry—the state will
once again try, as the saying goes, “to cut off its nose to spite its face.” Or
will it look back to and take heart from that “[not so] brief [1982-1997]
shining [fairly brightly] moment[s]” that [were] known initially as “the

37. A not insignificant number of Mississippi parents have a go at home
schooling their children. See MISS. CODE § 37-13-91(3)(c), see also, Mississippi Home
School Guidelines, 7 Miss. Admin. Code Pt., R. 30.7. Contact Mississippi Home
Educators Assn., www.mhea.net.
38. In 2017, approximately 8.1% of all school age children were being
siphoned off into private schools, and this percentage is reasonably expected to increase
gradually for the foreseeable future.
39. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 7; see the author’s “Of the Paramount Allegiance
of the Citizens of this State,” CABA Newsletter/Articles, Posted May 2013;
http://caba.ms/articles/features/paramount-allegiance.html.
40. U. S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
41. A voucher school program is at times cussed and discussed, and, if ever
enacted on any substantial level, may present a significant federal or state constitutional
test.
42. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 7. See discussions herein of the Alexander and
Ayres cases.
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Education Reform Act of 1982,”43 to the end of a public order of human
dignity for one and all.
III. FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
At the advent of the third decade of the Twenty-first Century,
Mississippi has found itself living under a constitutional mandate that
The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the
establishment, maintenance and support of free public
schools44 upon such conditions and limitations as the
Legislature may prescribe.45
Section 201 says the legislature shall make three provisions regarding the
State’s “free public schools.” The legislature shall establish free public
schools. Then it shall maintain these free public schools. Finally, the
legislature shall support these free public schools. As fate, fear and the
constitutional draftsmen would have it, the teeth have largely been pulled
from these Section 201 mandates by the closing and facially discretionary
may clause.
The legislature has been told it may modify its three-step mandate
with “conditions” and “limitations” thereon, “as the legislature may
prescribe.” The core reality here is that—textually and linguistically—
Section 201 falls short of creating self-executing state responsibilities and
student rights on a firm mandate. Given this, Mississippi’s constitutional
jurisprudence—even without discretionary implementation—stops short of
43. See also the restoration of authority to compel school attendance, Miss.
Laws, ch. 671 (1987) (House Concurrent Resolution No. 9), formally inserted into the
state constitution on Dec. 4, 1987, the Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law,
MISS. CODE, § 37-13-91, and, as well, the Mississippi Accountability and Adequate
Education Program Act of 1997, MISS. CODE, ch. 151. See the provisions for a director
of the Office of Compulsory School Attendance and the duties thereof, MISS. CODE, §
37-13-83.
44. In State Teachers College v. Morris, 144 So. 374 (Miss. 1932), Chief
Justice Sydney M. Smith, for the majority, and Justice George H. Ethridge in dissent,
engage in a useful debate regarding the meaning of “free public school.” This article
proceeds on the premise that Chief Justice Smith’s opinion is controlling. See also
Justice Ann Lamar’s controlling opinion in Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So.3d
598, 605 (¶15) (Miss. 2012) vs. Chief Justice William L. Waller, Jr., 91 So.3d at 608
(¶26), in dissent; and Justice John B. Holden’s controlling opinion in Miller v. State ex
rel. Russell, 94 So. 706, 708-709 (Miss. 1923), and Chief Justice Smith’s opinion in
dissent, 90 So. at 713.
45. MISS. CONST, art. VIII, § 201 (1890, as amended; see Miss. Laws, 1987,
ch. 671, effective Dec. 4, 1987) (italics provided).
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finding the goal of Section 201 more translatable into practical reality.46
And so the question has become whether—and to what extent and with
what effects—the Mississippi Accountability and Adequate Education
Program Act of 1997, and as amended [MAEP],47 implements Section 201
and does the work that, standing alone, Section 201 cannot do.
The 1970s saw a noble effort toward augmenting—constitutionally
and practicably—one means of approaching adequate funding for
Mississippi’s public schools. By 1980, that effort had led to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi’s exposition in Fondren v. State Tax Commission,48
after extensive litigation financed and otherwise supported privately by a
broad cross-section of public school patrons.49 The Fondren court held that
the then-current text of Miss. Const. Art. IV, § 112 [in those days, a sort of
state taxation equal protection clause], coupled with enforcing ad valorem
tax statutes already on the books, required that all property be carried by
the assessor in each county at its full and true fair market value. Prior to
1980, most real properties and improvements were carried on local tax rolls
at small and erratically varying fractions of their true value. All that was
needed to be done post-Fondren—to maintain local property tax bills at a
politically tolerable level—was for the respective county supervisors to
make a mathematically appropriate reduction in the millage rate. Common
political sense left little doubt but that, in any county where the supervisors
did not make the appropriate millage rate reduction, the next elections
would result in new holders of the offices of the erring supervisors.
But it wasn’t long before the legislative powers that be stepped in
and—quite effectively—used (or was it “responded to”) scare tactics to get
the voters to gut Fondren at its core, albeit this took a constitutional
amendment to complete the mischief. This amendment enshrined
unreasonably low assessment ratios in the formula for establishing the true
fair market value of assessable properties and was approved in 1986.50
46. Regarding the practice of making constitutional clauses self-executing, see,
e.g., Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Town of Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585, 588 (Miss. 1988).
47. MISS. CODE, ch. 151. The MAEP Act of 1997 effectively eviscerated an
earlier Attorney General Opinion, Thompson No. 58 (January 29, 1991). MISS. CODE §
37-151-6, which became law in 2007, put the nail in the coffin.
48. Fondren v. State Tax Comm’n, 387 So.2d 712 (Miss. 1980).
49. Quite a combination of state business, labor and education leaders had
hired counsel who brought and prosecuted this suit. See Fondren, 387 So. 2d at 713, for
the names of counsel in the case.
50. See 1986 amendment to MISS. CONST., art. IV, § 112, House Concurrent
Resolution No. 41, Miss. Laws, 1986, ch. 522, submitted to the electorate and ratified on
June 3, 1986; see Proclamation of Secretary of State, June 19, 1986. See also, John
Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution 85-87 (2d ed. 2014). Burrell v. Mississippi
State Tax Comm’n, discussed on Prof. Winkle’s page 86, was overruled in
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. Morgan, 110 So. 3d 752, 762-63 (¶27) (Miss. 2013).
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From a political perspective, these assessment ratios only proved what
anyone with elementary skills in arithmetic could see. Reducing the
millage rates would have done the trick, and from the next board of
supervisors meeting after Fondren was finally decided. All interest groups
would have been winners, particularly the once and future compulsory
attendance school-age children.
One fly in the ointment remained, viz., the established political
preference and practice that commercial and industrial property owners pay
taxes at a higher rate than the owners of real properties classed as
agricultural and residential, the latter of whom also had homestead
exemption deductions. With the 1986 amendments, a golden opportunity
to make provision for badly needed additional funding for public schools
was lost. And so the state has remained, for some thirty-plus years after the
fact, the people having forgotten that core lesson of citizenship—taxes are
the price we pay for civilization, a price sensible and responsible citizens
tend to believe is well worth paying.
IV. MAEP OF LATE
In 1997, under the authority of constitutional § 201, the legislature
established the Mississippi Adequate Education Program (MAEP).51
Exercising its constitutional discretion, the legislature has defined an
“adequate education program” as one with:
funding levels necessary for the programs of such school
district to meet at least a successful Level III [“C”] rating of
the accreditation system as established by the State Board of
Education using current statistically relevant state
assessment data.52
Simply put, MAEP at its core says to each public school district, “If you
establish and maintain a school district that is successful when measured by
the standards of the State Accreditation System, then the State will provide
sufficient funds for your students to succeed.”53 Of course, there is a
chicken-and-the-egg dimension here. Still, on March 24, 2006, the
legislature, including the governor—in solemn and constitutionally
51. See MISS. CODE § 37-151-6, authority for which lies in MISS. CONST., art.
VIII, § 201.
52. MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(a).
53. By law, each local school district is required annually to supply twentyseven per cent (27%) of basic adequate education program cost for its schools. Miss.
Code § 37-151-7(2)(a).
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authorized process—made a great leap forward,54 viz., “Effective with the
fiscal year 2007, the Legislature shall fully fund the Mississippi Adequate
Education Program.”55 No discretionary “may” qualifier afforded the State
room to wiggle out from under this public promise. On the contrary, the
State holds a judicial sledgehammer with which to make the locals divvy
up their twenty-seven percent share.
As noted, and as time and fate would have it, alternative, largely
non-public educational opportunities have emerged. In point of fact, public
support for MAEP has declined. October of 2017 provided a watershed
moment. The mandate of § 37-151-6 notwithstanding, the Supreme Court
of Mississippi declined the plea of twenty-one school districts that this
short, one sentence political promise be enforced as it has been so simply
written,56 so that in demonstrable fact the MAEP would be fully funded to
at least a “C” level quality.57 With less jurisprudential perception and spine
than were needed at the moment, the Clarksdale MSD case’s majority of
justices held that the funding level for MAEP was discretionary “[b]ecause
Section 37-151-6 does not obligate the Governor to sign a bill fully funding
MAEP.”58 A few years earlier, another valiant effort to add more teeth to
§ 201 via a constitutional initiative had failed legally and politically.59
V. STATE ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION60
A State Board of Education (SBE) has been created and given a few
general charges. The board must “formulate policies according to law for
implementation by the State Department of Education (SDE).”61 The
constitution directs the state board that it “shall manage and invest school
54. But see the problematic ruling in Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist. v. State of
Mississippi, 233 So. 3d 299 (Miss. 2017), the flaws in which are explained hereinbelow.
55. MISS. CODE § 37-151-6. Again, this is without derogation of each local
school district’s mandate to supply annually twenty-seven per cent (27%) of basic
adequate education program cost for that district. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7(2)(a).
56. The legislature has enjoined that, in all exercises of statutory construction
and application, “All words and phrases contained in the statutes are used according to
their common and ordinary acceptation and meaning; but technical words and phrases
according to their technical meaning.” MISS. CODE § 1-3-65. There are no technical
words in Section 37-151-6.
57. Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist. v. State of Mississippi, 233 So. 3d 299 (Miss.
2017).
58. Clarksdale Mun. Sch. Dist. v. State of Mississippi, 233 So. 3d 299, 305,
306, 307 (¶¶18-31) (Miss. 2017); see also, Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Town of
Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585, 588 (Miss. 1988).
59. Legislature of Mississippi v. Shipman, 170 So.3d 1211 (Miss. 2015).
60. See MISS. CONST., art. VIII, §§ 202, 203.
61. Id.
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funds according to law.”62 Other than these, the constitution says only that
the board shall “perform such other duties as prescribed by law.”63
“[A]ccording to law” twice set out, and “as prescribed by law”64 in the more
general constitutional authorization, refer to such laws as have been enacted
by the legislature with at least the acquiescence of the governor.65 In due
course, the legislature has prescribed a variety of duties for the board.66
A State Superintendent of Education is charged to direct “a central
management capacity” within the SDE; of course, at the end of the day, the
“law”67 here referred to is included within the governor’s constitutional
command that he or she “shall see that the laws are faithfully executed.”68
Past these, both “law” and “funds” within § 203 also include those received
from federal, state, charitable, and other sources. “Law” includes the
judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction—state and federal---and the
constitution, common law, and other principles upon which those
judgments rest. Religion and LGBTQ are among the several dimensions of
our collective active existence and recent history that afford contexts for
problematic educational administrative activity.
The nine state board members serve staggered nine-year terms.69
They receive their appointments from three sources. Five seats on the state
board are filled by the governor, though not all simultaneously. At least
one such gubernatorial appointee must come from each of the three state
supreme court districts—northern, central, and southern.70
One gubernatorial appointee must be actively engaged full-time as
a school administrator, and another must be a full-time schoolteacher.
Presumably, these occupational appointees must hold positions with public
schools in Mississippi. As well, “full-time basis” excludes county or
district school board members with other employments, though nothing is
said whether a person other than a county or district superintendent may
have this post. The lieutenant governor makes two at-large appointments
to the SBE. The speaker of the house of representatives also makes two atlarge appointments.71 Terms are staggered so that there can be no time
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. MISS. CONST., art. IV, § 72
66. MISS. CODE § 37-1-3.
67. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 203(2).
68. MISS. CONST. art. V, § 123.
69. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 203(2); MISS. CODE § 37-1-1.
70. These districts are subject to reconfiguration following the 2020 Census, if
that is necessary to make their populations approximately the same.
71. The criteria for appointment to the State Board are found in MISS. CONST.
art. VIII, § 203(2).
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when more than four state board members owe their appointments to the
same governor.
Then there is the meat in the coconut. “The State Board of Education
shall adopt and maintain a curriculum and course of study to be used in the
public school districts that is designed to prepare the state’s children and
youth to be productive, informed, creative citizens, workers, and leaders . .
. .”72 This awkwardly worded curriculum aspiration—not likely to get high
marks from a competent English grammar teacher—may be understood as
turning out productive citizens, productive workers, and productive leaders,
informed citizens, informed workers and informed leaders, and creative
citizens, creative workers, and creative leaders.
VI. FUNDING MAEP
We have seen that—as an outgrowth of the fifteen-year [1982-97]
“shining moment”—the political partnership that consists of the house of
representatives, the senate, and the governor has exercised its constitutional
authority and prescribed a formula for computing the state’s annual
allocation of funds for operating the MAEP.73 This funding formula has
been designed to assure that every student is afforded an opportunity for at
least a “Successful” [“C”] level education regardless of where s/he lives.74
The State Board has recognized that to meet this goal, the system must: (a)
provide equity by recognizing differences in local resources, and (b)
provide a level of resources necessary that adequate educational
opportunities will be available for each school-age child.
The MAEP statutory funding formula is of some complexity, and
some of its minutiae are beyond the scope of this elaboration.75 Summarily,
funding for each district is a function of average daily attendance and basic
student cost. The cost of educating each such student76 multiplied by
average daily student attendance.77 As noted, twenty-seven percent (27%)
of this annual allocation comes from the local school district level. Then
there are add-ons, inflation factors, trust funds, and other complications laid
out in the roughly eleven pages of statutory text that make up § 37-151-7.78
72. MISS. CODE § 37-1-3(2)(a).
73. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7.
74. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7.
75. A Class I (“A+” grade) math student is likely needed here.
76. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7(1)(b).
77. MISS. CODE § 37-151-7(1)(a).
78. Recognizing that many in need of understanding matters such as those
presented in this chapter were not math majors in college, the Mississippi State
Department of Education, Office of School Financial Services, has published and made
readily accessible power point presentations, viz., “MISSISSIPPI ADEQUATE
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THE UNFORTUNATE CLARKSDALE MSD DECISION

On careful study and reflection, it appears that Clarksdale MSD may
have been incorrectly decided. Any such suggestion is swimming upstream
against the same forces as was Fondren, noted above, and in the noble effort
that led to Shipman, sadly put to rest in 2015. Recent history suggests the
same political resistance forces remain “out there,” probably stronger and
more self-centered than in the days following Fondren and, as well, in the
State’s failure to follow through with its solemn and unequivocal political
promise made in 2007 for fully funding MAEP79 and, more recently, by
rejecting Shipman and its accompanying constitutional initiative.
Foremost, a significant percentage of white public school patrons
want their children to attend largely white schools. These good people do
not believe they have the financial means at once to (a) pay private school
tuition, etc., (b) pay taxes sufficient to support public schools at the MAEP
level, and (c) maintain their preferred lifestyle. Moreover, most parents of
school age children—and with a viable alternative—do not find “C” quality
public schools acceptable. Still, the imperatives of state educational history
make it important that the jurisprudential problems with the Clarksdale
MSD decision be set out, explained and understood. These problems
include flaws in statutory analysis, in constitutional analysis, and in general
adjudicative jurisprudence. Also important is understanding the familiar
jurisprudential premise that a matter80 should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, where that is practicable.81 To some, this premise
EDUCATION PROGRAM (MAEP), An Overview Of How The Formula Is Calculated,”
and “MISSISSIPPI ADEQUATE EDUCATION PROGRAM (MAEP), An Overview Of
How The Base Student Cost (BSC) Is Calculated.”
79. See MISS. CODE § 37-151-6 and its mandate for fully funding MAEP,
coupled with the governor’s oath and obligation that he or she “shall see that the laws are
faithfully executed.” MISS. CONST. art. V, § 123. The controlling opinion in Clarksdale
MSD is too timid when it comes to the governor’s mandatory duty. See Clarksdale MSD,
233 So. 3d at 305 (¶22). After all, the court must presume that the governor will
discharge his constitutional duty under Art. V., § 123. See Trotter v. Frank P. Gates &
Co., 139 So. 843, 845 (Miss. 1932). Indeed, all state officers are presumed to perform
their official duties, absent clear evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., State ex rel. Moore v.
Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 643 (Miss. 1991); Harris v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors,
366 So. 2d 651, 655-656 (Miss. 1979); Raper v. State, 317 So. 2d 709, 712 (Miss. 1975)
(presumption applies “to all Federal, state, county and municipal officers of high or low
rank”); Slay v. Lowery, 119 So. 819, 820 (Miss. 1928).
80. As well, keep in mind that “matter” is the common (if not exclusive)
constitutional word of choice for labeling that which is the object of the adjudicative
process. See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 146, 156, 159, 161.
81. See, e.g., In Matter of Adoption of D.D.H., 268 So.3d 449, 456-457 (¶¶ 3133) (Miss. 2018) (duty to deny a request to decide a constitutional question that is
unnecessary to the resolution of the litigation); Johnson v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 732

2021]

EDUCATING MISSISSIPPI

175

has been of biblical proportions,82 though at times it merely confuses the
familiar with the necessary83
To begin with and perhaps foremost, Clarksdale MSD is about the
legislative facts84 and circumstances relating to—and the meaning of, and
application and enforcement of—a statute. That statute has been
denominated Miss. Code. § 37-151-6. More narrowly, the controlling
opinion says that, to decide the case, “this Court must first look at the
language of the statute at issue.”85 Fine,86 as § 37-151-6 on its face, and in
its form and substance as well, is sufficient unto the day. No one suggests
there has ever been anything unconstitutional about § 37-151-6.
The text of the statute is set out in the next paragraph of the
Clarksdale MSD opinion.87 With little doubt, good English grammar
teachers will tell you that the simple wording and phrasing found in § 37151-6 means that each year, beginning with the fiscal/school year 2007, the
State should have fully funded MAEP, and, implicitly, continued to do
likewise in each succeeding year unless—and until—the statute is
substantially amended.
What really is—in the words of the Clarksdale MSD Court—
“particularly illuminating”88 is that the governor signed the version of § 37151-689 that the court was charged with construing, applying and ordering
So. 2d 864, 866 (¶ 9) (Miss. 1998) (same); Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. MP&L, 593 So.
2d 997, 1003 (Miss. 1991) (same); Hendricks v. State, 79 Miss. 368 (Miss. 1901)
(“courts should never decide constitutional questions except when necessary to the
disposition of a cause).
82. See Miss. Power Co. v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 168 So. 3d 905, 910
(¶7) (Miss. 2015); Broadhead v. Monaghan, 117 So. 2d 881, 888 (Miss. 1960). For an
impressive statement of this premise, see Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Jean v.
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 848, 854 (1985).
83. It would be helpful to have a copy of the Clarksdale MSD opinion in hand
while reviewing and considering the above analysis.
84. The term “legislative facts” is used in the sense found in the Advisory
Committee Note to Miss. R. Evid. 201, and in cases such as Samuels v. Mladineo, 608
So. 2d 1170, 1183-1186 (Miss. 1992); and McPhail v. State, 180 So. 387, 388-389 (Miss.
1938).
85. Clarksdale MSD, 233 So. 3d at 299, 305 (¶20).
86. Of course, the notion of seeking “legislative intent”—the actual thoughts in
the minds of legislators—is impracticable and approaching nonsense. The question
always involves assessing what the collective legislature said and what the governor did
not veto, not what one, or more, or even the majority of the collective legislature of two
separate houses actually and in fact—and at that moment in legislative time---intended,
nor what the governor had in mind when he engaged in the legislative act of signing the
bill, or at least the omission of not vetoing the bill.
87. Clarksdale MSD, 233 So. 3d at 305 (¶21).
88. See text in Clarksdale MSD, 233 So. 3d at 305 (¶21).
89. See Miss. Laws 2006, ch. 473, § 2, eff. from and after passage (approved
March 24, 2006).
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enforced, with the text that the court correctly assumed was controlling.
Unless amended, that statutory text controls as written—[and should have
been held to control in Clarksdale MSD]—all future actions otherwise
subject to § 37-151-6. The most that can be said of the governor’s role is
that, any thought of a veto vel non has been and remains legally premature.90
The court never—with judicial propriety—reaches the proposition set out
in Clarksdale MSD’s ¶22 until there has been—in actual political fact—a
veto of a MAEP fiscal year funding bill. Nothing in Clarksdale MSD
suggests there ever has been any such veto.
As a matter of elementary legal reasoning and understanding, any
thought of the governor’s signature vel non in Clarksdale MSD—as that
matter stood on October 19, 2017, the day of decision—is a non-justiciable
issue. That matter fails the “ripeness” requisite for justiciability. In
terminology more familiar to some, there is no case or controversy. Under
state law, no one could satisfy the ground rules for a declaratory judgment
action91 as to whether the governor would—or would not—sign or veto a
particular MAEP fiscal year funding bill.
The conclusory ¶22 in Clarksdale MSD fails for the reasons noted
above, particularly given that the governor timely otherwise properly
signed the bill which begins “Effective with the fiscal year 2007, the
Legislature shall . . . .” No subsequent legal text ameliorates this mandatory
“shall”.92 One might safely “bet the farm” that every competent English
grammar teacher in a Mississippi public school would give the Supreme
Court an “A,” if it so construed and applied this mandatory “shall.” No
constitutional premise precludes the state from obligating itself as it has
done in §37-151-6. This statutory text has enough specificity and simplicity
that—as written and enacted, including being timely signed by the
governor—it should have carried the day.
The state has no honorable way around the fact that it has a public
and politically moral obligation—and on reasonable, practicable, and
fiscally responsible terms—of making up the funds not provided over the
years since 2007 when the §37-151-6 promise was first broken, albeit, to
be sure, many students who were entitled to the benefits of those funds have
90. The reference here is to ripeness, that door opening, earliest stage in the
jurisprudential process of justiciability, and its practice. This premise is explained in §
1:25 Ripeness, Subject Matter Jurisdiction chapter, in Mississippi Civil Procedure, Vol. 1
(Jackson, et al., eds. 2019).
91. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 57.
92. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 287 So. 3d 905, 918 (¶51) (Miss. 2019) (“the
word “shall” when used in a statute, is mandatory”); In Interest of E.K., a Minor, 249 So.
3d 377, 383 (¶21) (Miss. 2018) (same); High v. Kuhn, 240 So.3d 1198, 1201 fn. 5 (¶15)
(Miss. 2017) (same); Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 933 So. 2d 927, 929 (¶5) (Miss. 2006)
(same); In Interest of D. D. B., A Minor, 816 So. 2d 380, 382 (¶7) (Miss. 2002) (same).
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completed most---if not all---of their public education in the absence of
those funds, and others who would have benefited have some—if not all—
of their public school experience remaining ahead of them.
VIII.

THE FLAWED END-RUN ATTEMPT BY CLARKSDALE MSD’S
CONCURRING JUSTICES

No doubt because they saw the flaws in the majority opinion in
Clarksdale MSD, Justices Maxwell and Coleman filed concurring opinions,
arguing another way out, viz., that Article I’s constitutional “separation of
powers” provisions control. With respect, each was wrong, and remains so.
Initially, each overlooked the constitutional and practical reality that “there
is no natural law of separation of powers. Rather, the powers of government
are separate only insofar as the Constitution makes them separate.”93
Equally as fundamental, the state clings to a regime of constitutional
“checks and balances.”94 History teaches that you can’t have it both ways.
There can be no meaningful “checks and balances” without there also being
encroachments by officials in one department upon and thwarting the
ostensible prerogatives of at least one of the other two. This is why there
is no absolute separation of powers in state constitutional law, never has
been, never will be, though some have mistakenly—and no doubt in good
faith—argued to the contrary.95
More directly, the core reason why Justices Maxwell and Coleman
were mistaken in Clarksdale MSD is simple, viz., all gubernatorial powers
that could possibly have been brought to bear were and are “legislative” in
their nature and practical effect, and in the sense contemplated by a
reasonable reading of Article I. What these two justices overlooked was
that the constitution’s “signing sub-clause”96 and “veto sub-clause”97 grant
the governor powers that are legislative in every real and practical and
constitutional sense.
The idea that the governor’s action in signing or vetoing a bill is a
legislative act is hardly novel in Mississippi, or anywhere else in the United
93. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 346 (Miss. 1987) states and
explains this premise, which has been followed in Myers v. City of McComb, 943 So. 2d
1, 6 (¶20) (Miss. 2006); see also, Jordan v. Smith, 669 So. 2d 752, 756 (Miss. 1996).
94. See, e.g., In Re Fiscal Year 2010 Judicial Branch Appropriations, 27 So. 3d
394, 395 [1] (Miss. 2010); Myers v. City of McComb, 943 So.2d 1, 7 (¶21) (Miss. 2006);
Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998, 1002, 1003 (Miss. 1995)
95. See Gunn v. Hughes, 210 So. 3d 969, 973-974 (¶¶ 16, 17) (Miss. 2017);
see also, Alexander v. State By and Through Allain, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1336 (Miss. 1983),
(“the idealistic concept of absolute separation of powers”).
96. MISS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 72, 73.
97. MISS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 72, 73.
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States. Indeed, one of this state’s great legal scholars, Justice Josiah A. P.
Campbell, explained the point a long time ago, viz.,
Grant that the governor in signing a bill thereby evidencing
his approval, does perform a legislative act. It is as a
governor that he acts legislatively, as prescribed by the
constitution. 98
Nationally known state constitutional scholar, the late Judge Thomas M.
Cooley, in his famous treatise, reported that “in the approval of laws, the
governor is a component part of the legislature.”99
It is the nature and function of a governmental power that
determines its Article I category. The “signing sub-clause” and “veto subclause” are polar opposites in exercise and effect. These clauses
contemplate, authorize and direct the exercise of “legislative powers,” and
only legislative powers. Either a signing or a veto is the performance of a
political power that is legislative in constitutional nature and in its political
and practical reality. Because their effects are forward looking—focusing
on what the law will be going forward—these either/or alternative activities
are just as much the exercise of legislative powers as are the actions of
members of the house and senate in passing such a bill in the first place.
It is a simple mistake to assume that everything a governor does is
the exercise of an executive power. Not so at all. The key to understanding
this comes when one has in mind how many public officials in this and no
doubt other states are constitutionally given—and actively exercise—
differing powers that fall within two—and occasionally even all three—of
the powers identified and discussed in Article I of the Mississippi
Constitution. Most familiar of all are the justices of the Supreme Court of
Mississippi when they make what we still call common law100 or in some
instances equitable remedies.101
Put another way, a bill such as the one that became § 37-151-6, or
one that may have failed, was subject the same procedural process. At its
core, to become law a bill has to receive a majority vote of one (or more)
from the house of representatives, from the senate, and from the governor.
98. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Bd. of Supervisors of Coahoma Cty., 64
Miss. 358, 364, 1 So. 501, 502-503 (1887) (emphasis added).
99. Hardee v. Gibbs, 50 Miss. 802, 809 [••4], 1874 WL 6529 (Miss. 1874),
quoting Cooley on Constitutional Limitations at 155 (1878).
100. See, e.g., Parker v. Benoist, 160 So. 3d 198 (Miss. 2015), which made new
state law in the field of donative transfers of property. More globally, see “The Coming
of the Common Law in Mississippi” in my Heroes, Rascals and the Law; Constitutional
Encounters in Mississippi History 301-370 (2019).
101. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 460-67 (Miss. 1983).
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And in a proper and timely sequence. At each of these three stages, a single
vote majority sufficed. In the 122-member house of representatives,102 62
affirmative votes will carry the day, or fewer if the issue were one where
by rule the majority of those present and voting would suffice. Similarly,
in the 52-member senate, 27 affirmative votes will ordinarily suffice,
subject to the same caveat.103 In the case of the governor, of course, a 1-0
vote is all it takes.104
Just as the lieutenant governor is given both legislative and
executive powers,105 so also is the governor given executive and legislative
powers. These legislative gubernatorial powers and practices include
making recommendations to the legislature regarding bills that should be
passed, amended or rejected.106 And they include acting in accordance with
the “signing sub-clause” and/or the “veto sub-clause” of the constitution,
authority for calling special legislative sessions, and no doubt more.
For present purposes, one gubernatorial power is front and center.
It is that found in Article V, labeled “Executive.” “The Governor shall see
that the laws are faithfully executed.”107 Nothing in the constitution or any
other law or known political authority exempts §37-151-6 from the
category “the laws” with respect to which the governor–on his oath–has the
job of “faithful . . . execut[ion].”
IX. A PROPER CLARKSDALE MSD ADJUDICATION
The above points aside, there are two more discrete and independent
errors or omissions in the Clarksdale MSD opinions. For one, consider the
justices’ failure to construe and apply and enforce the term “adequate” in
Mississippi Adequate Education Program.108 With little doubt, a team of
expert witnesses, well qualified within Miss. R. Evid. 702, could be
102. See Mississippi Official & Statistical Register (Blue Book) 2016-2020, at
pages 119-120 (2017).
103. See Mississippi Official & Statistical Register (Blue Book) 2016-2020, at
pages 98-99 (2017).
104. See Mississippi Official & Statistical Register (Blue Book) 2016-2020, at
page 77 (2017).
105. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332 (Miss. 1987).
106. See MISS. CONST., art. V, § 122.
107. MISS. CONST. art. V, § 123; see Clark v. Bryant, 253 So. 3d 297, 303 (¶32)
(Miss. 2018) (“The Governor (as head of the executive branch) must faithfully execute
all laws passed by the Legislature.”)
108. MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(a) defines “Adequate program,” or “adequate
education program” or “Mississippi Adequate Education Program (MAEP)”. Obviously,
this definition — funding level necessary “to meet at least a successful Level III rating”
according to the SBE’s accreditation system — should be given substantial consideration
by any such Miss. R. Evid. 702 qualified experts.
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assembled to establish the proposition of adjudicative (if not also
legislative) fact109 whether the level of MAEP funding since 2007 has been
“adequate.” And the consequential fact whether the quality of education
afforded Mississippi’s students could fairly be labeled “adequate.”
To be sure, the term “adequate” is highly general. But “adequate”
is no more general or difficult of construction and application than are
“reasonable,” “unusual,” “excessive,” “liberty,” “freedom,” “negligent”
and numerous other terms set forth in the laws that judges and other
authorized public officials are — every day — expected to construe and
apply, and in a great variety of settings. At the least, “adequate” acquires
flesh from the state’s declared imperative of educating its youths “to
be(come) productive, informed, creative citizens, workers and leaders.”110
An outcome determinative adjudication of “adequacy”111 vel non would
have the added benefit of honoring the practice of deciding matters on nonconstitutional grounds, where that is feasible.
Second, there is the equity imperative. Historically, the most
important policy statement here is attributed to Horace Mann, father of the
“Common Schools” movement in the Northeast back in the Nineteenth
Century.
Education then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is
a great equalizer of the conditions of men (and women)—
the balance wheel of the social machinery.112
You start with the legislative facts that Mississippi has long been at
or near the bottom, among impoverished states in the Union, and has among
109. Justice Virgil Griffith’s findings regarding activities along the “Gold
Coast” justifying the governor’s decision to order a raid are a familiar example of
legislative facts found by one of the state’s most respected jurists. State v. McPhail, 180
So. 387, 388-389 (Miss. 1938); MHSAA v. Hattiesburg High Sch., 178 So. 3d 1208,
1216 (¶31) (Miss. 2015); Cook v. Bd. of Supervisors of Lowndes Cty., 571 So. 2d 932,
935 (Miss. 1990); also, Miss. R. Evid., Advisory Committee Note to Rule 201.
110. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-1-3(2)(a).
111. The legislature has defined “adequate program” or “adequate education
program” for purposes of the MAEP Act as the funds needed “for the programs of such
school district to meet at least a successful Level III (“C”) rating of the accreditation
system as established by the State Board of Education using current statistically relevant
state assessment data.” MISS. CODE § 37-151-5(a). Presumably, this definition will be
persuasive, in the absence of a finding otherwise supported by substantial evidence
which satisfies criteria of Miss. R. Evid. 702.
112. Horace Mann, 1848, as cited in Education and Social Inequity, (n.d.); also
www.brainyquote.com/Horace Mann Quotes; see also, Roslin Growe & Paula S.
Montgomery, “Educational Equity in America: Is Education the Great Equalizer?,” The
Professional Educator, Vol. XXV, 23 (Spring 2003).
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its citizens a larger percentage of non-Caucasians than any other state. As
well, the state’s citizens have been less able to pay the tax man what he says
is his due than the people of most any other state. Add the fact that
Mississippi has also long been at or near the bottom rung when it comes to
the level of educational achievement by its citizenry.
Legally, one opening question is whether the State’s due process
clause113 might reasonably be construed to confer an equity or equal
protection right? Cannot the same be said of the Open Courts Clause which,
when you look at the text in historical context, is a contemporary expression
of Magna Carta.114 Then there is the Unenumerated Rights Clause,115
which may be the best bet. Building upon the state’s constitutional
educational imperative dating back to 1817, followed with the enhanced
imperative, given the state’s lack of quality of life which with high
probability may be attributed to poor educational attainments, and the case
should be there, beyond reasonable dispute, thus rendering non-optional
“fully fund[ing] the Mississippi Adequate Education Program” to a level
higher than Level III.
Turning to the facts [adjudicative and/or legislative], it doesn’t take
much knowledge of the demographics of Mississippi to understand that
there are substantial differences between and among the affected persons
within the twenty-one school districts that were plaintiffs in Clarksdale
MSD. These differences range from the Prentiss County School District in
Northeast Mississippi, where the minority population was so low that back
in the 1970s the district was never brought under a federal court
desegregation order, on the one hand, to the many Delta area districts with
increasingly heavy minority populations. Absent from the Clarksdale MSD
suit were the state’s more affluent school districts, e.g., DeSoto County near
Memphis, any of the school districts in Jackson County116 with an industrial
base and near Mobile, Harrison County [Biloxi and Gulfport], Lee County
[Tupelo], Lafayette County [Oxford and University of Mississippi],
Oktibbeha County [Starkville and Mississippi State University].
Hattiesburg School District was a plaintiff, but that district does not include
the affluent parts of the Forrest/Lamar County area, and the University of
Southern Mississippi is not on the tax rolls.
Then there are great and disparate funding inequities, from county
to county among Mississippi’s eighty-two, and from school district to
113. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 14.
114. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24; see also the last three paragraphs of Justice
Virgil Griffith’s opinion in State v. McPhail, 180 So. 387, 391 (Miss. 1938).
115. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 32.
116. See Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598 (Miss. 2012), discussed
below.
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school district.117
Able counsel with a bevy of qualified and articulate educational
management professionals should be able to take it from there, so long, that
is, as the simple promise of Section 37-151-6 remains on the books, an
aspirational imperative, if nothing else. A new generation supporting a
Shipman-like constitutional amendment is bound to come. The lesson from
Fondren through the “shining” years from 1982 through 1997, and then the
Shipman advocates, is nothing less. As in 1817 and 1832, “schools and the
means of education, shall forever be encouraged in this State.”
X. REVENUES FROM SIXTEENTH SECTION LANDS—THE “RAINY DAY”
FUND AND MORE
We have seen above how MAEP reflects a deal made in 2007
between the state and its public school districts. Each district agreed to
make all reasonable efforts to turn out students who are able to satisfy the
MSBE accountability scale of “Successful” [“C”]. The state agreed to
provide the funds needed to enable and facilitate such educational
achievements, no matter where within each respective district the students
live. One big fly in the ointment remains. The legislature has hardly ever
fully funded MAEP, its express commitment made in plain English in § 37151-6 to the contrary notwithstanding.
Over and above MAEP, the Sixteenth Section School Lands Trust
has continued as a significant source of funding for the public schools.118
The important variable here has been that the benefits a particular district
draws from the trust are as variable as the factors that make up the fair
market value of this tract of real property, or that. Because land values have
varied widely, School Land Trust benefits available to the school districts
have also varied widely.
An obligatory return to the proverbial page of history.119 For years,
and for largely local political reasons, these school trust lands were leased
for at best nominal rentals. The 99-year leases for token rentals following
the Civil War became infamous, an infamy of constitutional proportions. It
has now been well settled that rentals or other considerations substantially
below approximate fair market value are prohibited by the No Donation
Clause120 of the Constitution.
117. Herein of one of the practical inequity problems produced by Pascagoula
Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598 (Miss. 2012), discussed below.
118. See MISS. CODE § 29-3-1, re local control of school lands trust.
119. See John Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution, 130-133 (2d ed.
2014).
120. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 95; see particularly Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d
1, 9-12, (Miss. 1989); Clark v. Stephen D. Lee Found., 887 So. 2d 798, 803 (¶16) (Miss.
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One paragraph on this page of history tells a story that began in the
late 1980s. The Supreme Court of Mississippi faced the question
whether—within the context of Section 211 of the Constitution and
regarding Sixteenth Section Lands—oil & gas leases that the state had
granted could extend longer than twenty-five years, though the particular
well at issue was still producing more than fifty years after discovery, with
no end in sight. In a rather wooden analysis, the court held such mineral
leases void after twenty-five years.121 Likely as a result of two strong
dissenting opinions,122 the people amended Section 211 the very next year,
providing that “the Legislature may provide, by general law, for leases on
liquid, solid or gaseous minerals with terms coextensive with the operations
to produce such minerals.”123 Of course, the primary natural asset of many
acres of trust lands has been valuable growing timber. Other such lands
have been cleared and have fair market rental values according to the crops
that they may yield, not to mention variables ranging from the dynamics of
commodities markets to the vagaries of the weatherman. Few foresaw the
spring of 2019 floods that ravaged the normally productive Mississippi
Delta farmlands. For these and other reasons, the fair market value of
sixteenth sections and “lieu lands” have varied widely, beginning with that
core criteria of value—location, location and location.
The Chickasaw Cession of 1832 further complicates the story.
Putting numbers—values and annual income—on the lands that should
have gone into the School Lands Trust, but didn’t, is even more
problematic. The story—told above—of that historic foible centers on the
litigation led to the U. S. Supreme Court in 1986.124 Establishing the school
districts of those twenty-three counties in a position of equity with the rest
of the state may never be fully accomplished.
All of this—and much more—is precedent to the benefits enjoyed
by Mississippi’s public school districts in recent years. One school district
may find that it needs a few new school buses. The rainy day fund is there.
A high school may need to expand its library resources. Or a new football
stadium or other sports venue. The Sixteenth Section money in the bank is
2004); Bd. of Educ. of Lamar Cty. v. Hudson, 585 So. 2d 683, 687 (Miss. 1991). A
driving practical force behind the scenes in Oktibbeha Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Town of
Sturgis, 531 So. 2d 585 (Miss. 1988), was that a decision otherwise would have had the
effect of approving a more contemporary 99-year lease for an outrageously low rental.
121. Chevron U. S. A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644 (Miss. 1991). See
discussion in John Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution 130-131 (2d ed. 2014).
122. Chevron U. S. A., Inc. v. State, 578 So. 2d 644, 650-658, 658-666 (Miss.
1991).
123. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 211(b) (1890, as amended Nov. 3, 1992); see
Miss. Laws, 1992, ch. 591 (Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 552).
124. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
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there. A third school may need several new teachers at different levels and
in different fields of study. Or facilities and equipment for its concert or
marching band. Chances are that the school lands trust funds are sufficient
unto the day.125 Building improvements, furniture and equipment, special
interest programs, support for extra-curricular activities, and dozens of
other not necessarily recurring financial needs are filled from School Lands
Trust funds that are readily available.
XI. SUPPLEMENTAL LOCAL ASSESSMENTS
As explained above, the constitution provides first and foremost that
funding for public education in Mississippi is handled on a statewide
basis.126 Recognizing, however, that people residing in some counties or
separate school districts may place a higher value on public education—
than a merely “adequate education”—above and beyond the political values
found among the often niggardly legislators in Jackson, the constitution
makers have given us section 206, which provides, in relevant part, that
“Any county or separate school district may levy an additional tax, as
prescribed by general law, to maintain its schools.”127
It has been the great good fortune of the Pascagoula School District
(PSD)128 that an oil refinery and gas terminal have been constructed within
its boundaries, and that these properties produce substantial ad valorem tax
revenues. In 2011, however, the legislature enacted that the revenue from
such assessable property should be distributed among all public school
districts in the entire county, not just the district in which such facilities are
located. This new law meant that the Ocean Springs School District, the
Moss Point School District, and Jackson County School District, would
share these ad valorem revenues, though the physical facilities so assessed
and taxed lay wholly within the PSD’s political boundaries.
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the applicable
words and phrases of Section 206 mean what they simply say. Every school
district is empowered to assess and levy an additional tax upon assets
within that district to “maintain its schools.” Applying elementary school
125. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-3-1 (2020), viz., “Sixteenth section school
lands, or lands granted in lieu thereof, constitute property held in trust for the benefit of
the public schools and must be treated as such.”
126. MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 206, providing for the “state common-school
fund.”
127. Id. (emphasis added). While the title of a constitutional section ordinarily
provides no substantive content, the second phrase in the title of Section 206 may be
noteworthy, viz., “State common-school fund; additional tax levy by district.”
128. The district is now known as the Pascagoula-Gautier School District
(PGSD).
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linguistics and grammar, the PSD was held entitled—at its discretion—to
“maintain its schools” by assessing and levying upon the valuable revenue
producing oil refinery and gas terminal which physically lay entirely within
the PSD’s geographical and political confines.129 One might safely “bet the
farm” that every competent English grammar teacher in the Jackson County
public schools would give the Supreme Court an “A.”
XII.

CHARTER SCHOOLS130

The Mississippi Charter Schools Act131 has been introduced.
Charter schools are public schools that are a “part of the state’s public
education system.”132 A charter school may only operate in a school district
which the State Board of Education has designated as an “A,” “B,” or “C”
school, these in accordance with the applicable accreditation system, if
approved by the local district school board.133 For the 2019-2020 school
year, Mississippi Charter School Authorizer Board (MCSAB) oversaw six
public charter schools, five in the Jackson area and one in Clarksdale.134
Another public charter school, Leflore Legacy Academy in Greenwood,
opened in the fall of 2020, for sixth through ninth grade students only.
In “D” and “F” rated public school districts, an applicant may be
approved with no local board action by the SBE, the agency created to
approve the establishment of any charter school in the state.135 In “D” or
“F” districts, a prospective charter school operator must first file an
application with the SBE. The application process begins in January of each
year and concludes in the following September, when the SBE makes final
decisions on the applications.136 The application process is conducted in
three phases. During the process, the SBE examines and considers many
criteria, including the applicant’s proposed academic program, discipline
policies, organizational structure, pupil transportation, food services, and
must be accompanied by a proposed budget and financial plan.137 If the
applicant has satisfied all of the criteria and has shown an ability to operate
129. Pascagoula Sch. Dist. v. Tucker, 91 So. 3d 598, 599, 602, 604-607 (¶¶ 1, 7,
14, 15, 19, 22) (Miss. 2012).
130. Araujo v. Bryant, 283 So. 3d 73 (Miss. 2019) (charter schools funding
upheld).
131. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-1, et seq (2016).
132. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-3(2) (2016).
133. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-7(2)(c) (2016).
134. Clarksdale Collegiate Charter School received an extensive, quite lengthy
and largely favorable front page feature review in The (Jackson) Clarion Ledger, Sept.
19, 2019.
135. See, generally, MISS. CODE §§ 37-28-7, -9 and -19 (2016).
136. See www.charterschoolboard.ms.gov/Pages/RFP.aspx.
137. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-15 (Rev. 2019).
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a school successfully, the SBE may then approve the application. On the
other hand, the SBE may deny an application, though it must set forth the
reasons for doing so.138 Once an application has been approved, the SBE
and the applicant then negotiate a charter setting forth the terms and
conditions of the operation of the school.139 The charter is a contract
between the SBE and the school, which sets forth terms and conditions for
the operation of the school for a period of five years, subject to renewal at
the end of the initial five-year term.140
Any student residing within the geographic boundaries of a school
district in which the charter school is located may attend that school.141 In
addition, any student may attend the charter school, if he or she resides in a
school district rated “C,” “D,” or “F,” either at the time the school was
approved by the Board, or at the time the student enrolls.142 A charter
school may not limit admission “based on ethnicity, national origin,
religion, gender, income level, disabling condition, proficiency in the
English language, or academic or athletic ability.”143
The charter may limit students based on certain ages or grade levels
and may organize based on a specific theme, concept or focus, such as
students with disabilities, same gender, students with disciplinary problems
or students at risk of academic failure.144 Also, [t]he underserved students
of a charter school’s enrollment collectively must reflect that students of all
ages attending schools in the district in which the school is located, defined
for the purposes of this chapter as being at least eighty per cent (80%) of
that population.145 The charter school must enroll all students who wish to
attend unless the number exceeds the school’s capacity,146 in which event
the school must select students by lottery.147 Once established, the charter
school must give enrollment preference to students enrolled in the school
in the previous year and to siblings of students enrolled.148 A charter school
may give enrollment preference to students of the applicant, board members
and employees as long as those students do not make up more than ten per
cent (10%) of the total student population.149
138. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-19 (Rev. 2019).
139. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-21 (Rev. 2019).
140. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-28-21, -33 (Rev. 2019).
141. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23 (Rev. 2019).
142. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-1(b) (Rev. 2019).
143. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-3 (2013).
144. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23.
145. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-5.
146. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-6.
147. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-7.
148. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23(8).
149. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-23(8).
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Funding for charter schools follows the student; that is, the charter
school receives a per student allocation of funds from the district in which
it resides and the SDE.150 The Supreme Court of Mississippi has upheld
the legitimacy of this funding mechanism.151 Charter schools may also
receive certain types of private funding such as grants, gifts and
donations.152
XIII.

VOUCHER SYSTEM

Government-issued vouchers are an alternative strategy for public
education which is practiced in a number of states. One important feature
of this educational funding format is that the student and/or his or her
parents have choices as to what schools they wish to attend. Another
argument for a voucher system is that it creates competition among schools,
which arguably results in higher quality educational opportunities being
available for school age students.
In recent years, Mississippi has offered a single and carefully
tailored voucher school program. The Nate Rogers Scholarship for
Students with Disabilities/Mississippi Speech Language Therapy
Scholarship has been available in K-6 grades for children suffering the
disability commonly known as dyslexia. There are separate programs for
children attending public and private schools.153
Mississippi has not had enough history with school vouchers that
credible, experience- based conclusions may be drawn. A good place to
start for persons wishing to pursue the subject is the “14 Pros and Cons of
School Vouchers,” published by Vittana.org.154
XIV. RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND RELATED ISSUES
Of course, as long as there are teachers who give examinations,
there will be prayers said in public schools, or so the saying goes. Yet there
have been and remain serious constitutional and other concerns about
blatantly Christian prayers, invocations, Bible readings, and other religious
observances that once were commonplace in Mississippi’s public schools,
e.g., devotionals held over the P. A. system at the beginning of each school
150. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-55 (2016).
151. Araujo, 283 So.3d at 73.
152. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-28-59.
153. See Mississippi Voucher Programs (March 2017),
http://ees.force.com/mbdata/mbprofallBSrt?Rep=VMS.
154. Louise Gaille, 14 Pros and Cons of School Vouchers, VITTANA.ORG
PERSONAL FINANCE BLOG (Mar. 8, 2021, 10:10 PM), https://vittana.org/14-pros-andcons-of-school-vouchers.
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day, or before the kickoff in high school football games, among other
occasions. The latter was held impermissible in the year 2000?155
The statutory backdrop on the books today dates back to 1997.
References to religion or “the use of religious literature, history, art, music
and other things having a religious significance” are permitted, so long as
they do not “aid any religious sect or sectarian purpose.”156 Public schools
are instructed to display in all classrooms enlarged posters stating “IN GOD
WE TRUST,” as this is the “motto of the United States of America.”157
Legal principles emanating from the Establishment Clause have
been brought to bear in Mississippi schoolhouses, along with other federal
authorities.158 For example, legislation prohibiting the teaching of the
Darwinian theory of evolution has been held impermissible and
unenforceable under Establishment Clause.159 Any effort to teach or
present so-called “creationism” should suffer a similar fate, and for the
same reasons. Past that, the plot thickens, time to trot out the familiar insight
that, in the law “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”160 The rise
of the secular society and the increasing variety of religions and faiths
beyond mainstream Christianity—and their passionate prejudices and
practices – have complicated matters since the simple exhortations of the
state’s first two constitutions.
The most prominent matter regarding religion in public schools has
been Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School Dist.,161 dating back to the mid1990s. A number of students, parents and public interest organizations

155. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); M. B., a minor
through Bedi v. Rankin Cty. Sch. Dist., 2015 WL 5023115 (S.D. Miss. 2015). See also,
Bd. of Trustees of Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Knox, 638 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1994) and
688 So. 2d 778 (Miss. 1997) (student read prayers).
156. 1997 Miss. Laws Ch. 599, codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §37-13-163(1).
157. 1970 Miss. Laws Ch. 374, codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §37-15-35. It is
hard to see how such an iteration survives under the Establishment Clause, or under its
counterpart in the Mississippi Constitution. See Constitutional Law, Ch. 19, §19:55,
“Freedom of Religion,” Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law (Third Edition), Vol. 3, April
2020.
158. Buford, at * 9-11. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, Superintendent, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
159. Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 693, 696-98 (Miss. 1970). A legislative
effort to bar the teaching of Darwinism succeeded on paper only. See Mitchel, A New
History of Mississippi 475 (2014). For a contemporary summary of issues surrounding
Darwinian evolution and so-called “intelligent design” theory, see Yuval Noah Harari,
Sapiens: A Brief History of Mankind 397-399 (2018).
160. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)
161. David Ingebretsen, Et Al. v. Jackson Public School Dist., 88 F.2d 274 (5th
Cir. 1996), affirming Ingebretsen v. Jackson PSD, 864 F.Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
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brought an action challenging a state statute162 which authorized public
school students to initiate non-sectarian, non-proselytizing prayers at
various compulsory and noncompulsory school events. The U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
The School Prayer Statute fails all three prongs of the Lemon
test[163] because its purpose is to advance prayer in public
schools, its effect is to advance religion in the schools and it
excessively entangles the government with religion.164
Shortly after Ingebretsen, a north Mississippi federal court
considered a matter involving a variety of religious practices in the
Pontotoc County. In 1996, Herdahl v. Pontotoc County School Dist.165
adjudged the viability of the school district’s efforts to evade a number of
U. S. Supreme Court cases relating to religious practices in public schools.
The fact driven Herdahl opinion considered intercom prayers,166 preofficial school day activities–a brief voluntary activity was permitted,167
classroom prayer–“[n]othing herein interferes in any way with each
student’s right to individually pray at the lunch table in the cafeteria, or to
individually pray silently at any other time,”168 and Bible class, not
permitted at all.169 Lemon correctly controlled the court’s constitutional
analysis.170
Circa 2013-2014, religion-related activities in Northwest Rankin
High School (NWRHS) in central Mississippi gave rise to the decision in
162. 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 609, § 1(2), codified as MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-4
& 37-13-4.1 (rev. 1990).
163. The state courts of Mississippi have applied the U. S. Supreme Court
Lemon construction of the Establishment Clause. See Roman Catholic Diocese of
Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213, 1224-25 (¶¶ 28-31) (Miss. 2005); Fountain v.
State ex rel MSDH, 608 So. 2d 705, 708 (Miss. 1992).
164. Ingebretsen, 88 F.2d at 279. As with all important cases cited in this
chapter, the opinion of the court should be read and studied in its entirety. This is
particularly so here, as there was a strong dissent filed on application for rehearing en
banc, with two Mississippi circuit judges joining the dissent. See Ingebretsen, 88 F.2d at
281-88.
165. Herdahl v. Pontotoc Cty. Sch. Dist., 933 F.Supp. 582 (Miss. 1996); prior
thereto, see Herdahl v. Pontotoc Cty. Sch. Dist., 887 F.Supp. 902 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
166. Herdahl, 933 F.Supp. at 586-89.
167. Id. at 589-91.
168. Id. at 591.
169. Id. at 591-93.
170. Id. at 593-98. U. S. District Judge Neal Biggers also cited and relied on Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), a pre-Lemon decision. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971). The Ingebretsen case was noted in its U. S. District Court iteration. See
Herdahl, 933 F.Supp. at 585, 588, 591, 593, 598.
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M. B., a minor, which produced points of interest.171 On July 17, 2013, the
school district had adopted a facially neutral and apparently permissible
Religion in Public Schools Policy. In April of 2014, the NWRHS held a
ceremony in the school assembly, honoring students who had scored well
on the ACT test. The school invited a pastor to deliver a prayer at this
school-sponsored event. Early in the ceremony, the pastor instructed the
students to bow their heads as he delivered his conventionally Christian
opening prayer.172 Such ceremonies had been regularly held in the past,
and “the 2014 event proceeded in its traditional fashion.”173 Relying on the
Establishment Clause and the Lemon case, the U. S. District Court
explained
[T]he invocation at the April 17, 2014 ACT Ceremony
blatantly violated these [previously stated] mandates. The
preacher-led prayer at this event was an affront to M.B. and
any of the other student who may not have shared the same
beliefs espoused by the reverend. In fact, even those who
are of the Christian faith (which may have included M.B.)
could have taken exception. Regardless of the faith shared
by a fraction or even a majority of its pupils, schools owe a
duty to all students to refrain from conduct which gives the
appearance of advocating a particular religion. In fairness to
and protection of all, they must remain neutral. This same
duty is owed to parents who submit their children to the
protection of educators. . . .174
But the 2014 ACT Ceremony was not all. In October of 2014, the
principal of the Northwest Rankin Elementary School “instructed all fifthgrade teachers to walk their students through a hallway where members of
a Christian association, Gideons International, were distributing Bibles.”
All of this was coordinated with the Gideons. Citing Lemon, the U. S.
District Court held that “Assisting with the distribution of Bibles to students
at school, during school hours, is inherently coercive,” and was
prohibited.175 Though predicated solely on the First Amendment, the
171. There are other procedural twists and turns in this case that are of little or
no interest.
172. M.B., a minor, at **5-6.
173. M.B., a minor, at *6.
174. M.B., a minor, at *6.
175. M.B., a minor, at *10. This federal constitutional ruling calls into serious
question the final clause of Miss. Const. Art. III, § 18, which provides that the state
constitution does not “exclude the Holy Bible from use in any public school in this
state.” M.B., a minor, and cases going back to Abingdon v. Schempp, for all practical
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principles applied and enforced in M. B. are consistent with settled
constructions and applications of Section 18 of the Mississippi
Constitution.176
Buford v. Coahoma Agricultural High School177 arose in a different
factual context. The complaining party was a school principal who had
been discharged for flagrantly violating the school’s religious neutrality
policy, viz., the principal led programs involving scriptural readings from
the Bible.178 Constitutional freedom of religion, conventional variety, was
upheld.
The M.B., a minor and Buford cases are worthy of reflection in light
of the Mississippi Student Religious Liberties Act, effective July 1, 2013.179
For one thing, the act has been crafted from the perspective of the student.
Its tenor is to put any student activity on a par with non-religious activities
that may be permitted in the school. The act is likely to be tested in the
courts, where it seems destined to expose for scrutiny the perennial
dilemma in the First Amendment, viz., the Free Exercise Clause leaves
people free to engage in all sorts of activities and practices that the
Establishment Clause would never permit the state to require or enforce.
There may be religion and free exercise-based absences from school
that should be recognized or honored. The legislature has enacted that
An absence may be excused if the religion to which the
compulsory-school-age child or the parents adheres, requires
or suggests the observance of a religious event. The approval
of the absence is within the discretion of the superintendent
of the school district, or his designee, but approval should be
granted unless the religion’s observance is of such a duration
purposes overrule Justice Julian Alexander’s eloquent opinion in Chance v. Mississippi
State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941), and,
as well, U. S. Circuit Judge J. P. Coleman’s opinion in Norwood v. Harrison, 340
F.Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1972), much of which takes Justice Alexander’s opinion and
quotes it verbatim, Norwood, 340 F.Supp. at 1008-1009, quoting Chance, 200 So. at 709710, 713. See also John Winkle, The Mississippi State Constitution, 43-44 (2d ed. 2014)
and Justice Anderson’s dissent in Chance, 200 So. at 714.
176. See MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18, which, if anything, is stronger than the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. First, “[n]o religious test as a
qualification for office shall be required.” Second, “no preference shall be given by law
to any religious sect or mode of worship.” See also, John Winkle, The Mississippi State
Constitution, 43-44 (2d ed. 2014).
177. Buford v. Coahoma Agricultural High Sch., 2014 WL 4692753 (N. D.
Miss. 2014).
178. Buford, at ** 3-5.
179. 2013 Miss. Laws ch. 334 (S.B. No. 2633); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-12-1
thru -13.
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as to interfere with the education of the child.180
School administration, funding and use of textbooks are other
contexts in which religious freedom issues have arisen and been
adjudicated. Miss. Const., art. VIII, § 208, provides that
No religious or other sect or sects shall ever control any part
of the school or other educational funds of this state, nor
shall any funds be appropriated toward the support of any
sectarian school. . . .
The constitution thus has long forbidden the use of public funds for the
support and operation of schools that have a religious or sectarian
affiliation.181
XV.

LGBTQ ISSUES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

In recent years, the rights and practices of gay and lesbian students
have drawn attention in Mississippi. In 2010, Itawamba Agricultural High
School in northeast Mississippi faced just such an issue. The school board
canceled the senior prom which had been scheduled for early April, rather
than let down barriers against the lesbian lifestyle. Constance McMillen,
an openly lesbian female student since the eighth grade, asked permission
that she be allowed to wear a tuxedo and bring her girl friend to the prom
as her date to the senior prom. School officials balked. Constance sued
them in federal court.
Citing established federal precedents, Judge Glen Davidson treated
Constance’s lifestyle and her then present proposal as forms of protected
speech, albeit of the non-verbal variety. The “expression of one’s identity
and affiliation to unique social groups may constitute speech as envisioned
by the First Amendment.”182 The court never mentioned the free speech
clause of the state constitution. This is of interest because, if anything, the
state’s free speech clause is stronger and more protective of the individual
than is the First Amendment.183 The Mississippi Constitution declares that
“freedom of speech . . . shall be held sacred . . . .”184 Nonetheless, Judge
Davidson invoked and quoted cases from a variety of other jurisdictions
180. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 37-13-91(4)(g).
181. State Teachers’ College v. Morris, 165 Miss. 758, 144 So. 374, 377 (1932);
See also Winkle, Mississippi State Constitution 129 (2d ed. 2014).
182. McMillen v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Dist., 702 F.Supp. 2d 699, 703 (N.D.
Miss. 2010).
183. See Gulf Pub. Co., Inc., v. Lee, 434 So. 2d 687, 696 (Miss. 1983).
184. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 13.
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and held that the school district “ha[d] violated . . . [Constance’s] First
Amendment rights by denying . . . [her] request to bring her girlfriend as
her date to the prom.”185 The school district may have been spared a large
damages award by a group of school parents, who privately organized a
senior prom to which “all IAHS students, including the plaintiff, are
welcome and encouraged to attend.”186
A similar issue arose the next year in a more southern part of the
state. A female lesbian student at Wesson Attendance Center sought to sit
for her senior yearbook portrait wearing male attire, a tuxedo. The court’s
opinion----denying her motion to dismiss—referred the matter to
mandatory mediation.187 A few years later, Judge Carlton Reeves cited
McMullen and Sturgis en route to authorizing a same-sex marriage in
Mississippi.188
Many who object to, or are offended by, LGBTQ lifestyles ground
their views in religion. This has brought to bear the state’s freedom of
religion clause which, in relevant part, reads,
[T]he free enjoyment of all religious sentiments . . . shall be
held sacred. The rights hereby secured shall not be
construed to justify acts of licentiousness injurious to morals
or dangerous to the peace and safety of the State, or to
exclude the Holy Bible from use in any public school of the
state.189
This constitutional text can be applied in differing ways in differing
contexts by different people.
Some (if not most) take the origin of the two sexes back to Genesis.
The biblical view of man and woman may well be a “religious sentiment”
that people may freely practice. On the other hand, the right to pursue
different LGBTQ lifestyles may be seen as respect for human dignity which
falls well within the “religious sentiments” of others. Some may find
sanction for such respect for human dignity190 in the New Testament, which
185. McMillen, 702 F.Supp.2d at 704. Extra-judicial statements on the rights of
gays and lesbians have been construed as constitutionally protected political speech.
Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006 (Miss.
1990).
186. McMillen, 702 F.Supp.2d at 706.
187. Sturgis v. Copiah Cty. Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 4351355 (S.D. Miss. 2011).
188. Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 64 F.Supp.3d 906, 936 (S.D.
Miss. 2014).
189. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18.
190. The late Prof. Myres S. McDougal of Prentiss County, Mississippi and the
Yale Law School, arguably Mississippi’s greatest Twentieth Century scholar, centered
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may lead to one use of the Christian Holy Bible which should not be off
limits in the public schools.191 Past these, reasonable people may disagree
on just what are “acts of licentiousness” and, assuming that first bridge is
crossed, upon whether those “acts” are “injurious to morals or dangerous to
the peace and safety of the State.” Members of the Itawamba County
School Board, and, as well, people in the community who opposed allowing
Constance to attend the senior prom with her girlfriend quite likely are
among those who view the lesbian lifestyle as involving “acts of
licentiousness” that are “injurious to morals or dangerous to the peace and
safety of the State.” In the end, Section 18 appears to give sanction to that
wisest view of human interactions that never made its literal way into the
Holy Bible or other religious texts – Live and Let Live!
XVI. HOME SCHOOLING
Mississippi has a compulsory school attendance law,192 as noted
above. Parents are responsible for seeing to it that all children between the
ages of six and 17 attend school regularly.193 Parents who do not see to it
that their school age children attend school, as required by law, are subject
to criminal sanctions.194 The experience-based premise for this compulsory
school attendance law takes us back to 1817 and statehood. This state’s
founders thought “knowledge . . . necessary to good government, the
preservation of liberty and the happiness of mankind.”195 And so we have
schools.
In its wisdom and experience, and within its constitutional
authority, the state has learned and legislated that there are multiple means
of acquiring “knowledge.” Many of these have been examined above. Last,
but not least, for present purposes, the state has authorized “legitimate home

much of his career promoting human dignity as a secular value. See my brief depiction,
“A Public Order of Human Dignity for All,” published in March 2020,
https://caba.ms/articles/features/public-order-of-human-dignity-for-all, an abbreviated
version of which appears below.
191. See M. B., a minor through Bedi v. Rankin County School Dist., 2015 WL
5023115 (S.D. Miss. 2015) discussed above.
192. See Mississippi Compulsory School Attendance Law, MISS. CODE § 37-1391 (2014), et seq.; see particularly §37-13-91(3)(c). See also, a problematic decision
regarding the county compulsory school attendance officers. In re R. G., 632 So. 2d 953
(Miss. 1994).
193. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-91(2)(f), -(3).
194. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-61, -63.
195. MISS. CONST. of 1817 art. VI, § 16.
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instruction program[s].”196 And so we have home school laws.197 A parent,
guardian or custodian of a child to be home schooled must procure a
certificate of enrollment issued by the SDE by September 15 of each
year.198 Without surprise, a home school program may not be “operated or
instituted for the purpose of avoiding or circumventing the compulsory
attendance law.”199
Parents build home school curriculums for PreK-12 in Mississippi.
Suffice it to say that these curricula vary from parent to parent, from child
to child. The better means of presenting the history and likely future of
such “home instruction programs” would be presenting a broad variety of
individual parent-built curricula, their implementation and their results.
This would enlarge greatly an exposition which may be arguably too long
anyway. Make no mistake about it; home schooling is as legitimate as it is
important as it is valuable towards the ends of family autonomy and dignity
and “the happiness of mankind” which have always been enhanced greatly
by “education,” albeit among many families and for many years home
instruction was the only means of education available.
XVII. CORNERSTONES OF HUMAN DIGNITY PROPERLY TAUGHT
At the outset, we named several great teachers who had been born
and bred in Mississippi. One of those is Myres Smith McDougal, who
hailed from rural Prentiss County in the northeastern corner of this state.
Years ago, Prof. McDougal and a colleague, Harold D. Lasswell, studied,
understood, articulated and elaborated eight value-institution cornerstones
of human dignity that each person on this planet might reasonably aspire
to. About half of these are particularly worthy of statement and elaboration
in connection with a proper education of the maturing children of this state.
Prof. McDougal envisioned a public order of human dignity that
should be taught to all. As a further anchor, Mac—ever the teacher—
“characterize[d] the social process as human beings interacting with one
another and with resources.”200 Relevant here and also to be taught in all
schools is the simple social practice of respect.201
196. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-91(2)(i), -(3)(c), -(9).
197. Time for Learning, Inc., (last visited, February 3, 2021), available at
https://www.time4learning.com/homeschooling/mississippi/laws-requirements.html.
198. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(3).
199. Id.
200. Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, Jurisprudence in Policy
Oriented Perspective, 19 FLA. L. REV. 468, 506 (1966-1967); Robertson, “A Public
Order of Human Dignity for All,” Capital Area Bar Assn., (posted March 2020),
https;//caba.ms/articles/features/public-order-of-human=dignity-for-all.
201. Id.
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People value their active participation within and among their
gender, race, nationality, geography, language, religion and other classes
and castes. Interest groupings, such as business associations, economic
councils, classmates, clubs and other more natural classes and castes are
exemplars of the practices or institutional cornerstones that enable human
and mutual respect. A touch or two of humility would enrich the practice
and experience of respect and self-respect in most any context.
Then there is the cornerstone of well-being.202 Well-being includes
“health, safety and comfort arrangements.” It is valued because it makes
so much more possible within a person’s time in this humanity, this
existence. Protection of life, liberty and property three prominent and
invaluable exemplars. Hospitals, medical clinics, health-plexes, retirement
homes and other like facilities and services are practical and institutional
cornerstones that enable well-being and longevity, as are criminal justice,
including law enforcement, police, public safety and fire protection
enablers of well-being and thus human dignity.
Then there is the cornerstone of affection,203 viz., “family,
friendship, circles, loyalty.” Family speaks for itself, along with how much
of a family, its humanity and longevity one is privileged and fated to enjoy.
One values friendship both received and given, experiences circles of
colleagues, acquaintances and passers-by, and each of us cherishes loyalty
given and experienced. Practical and institutional cornerstones make each
more tangible, enriching each, that reciprocal affections may enhance the
capacity for connection as progenitor of “a public order of human dignity
on the widest possible scale.”
Then there is the cornerstone of rectitude,204 viz., “churches and
related articulators and appliers of standards of responsible conduct.” Most
people have a fair sense of “right and wrong” and even shades of gray, and
how these inform and nourish the other cornerstones of human dignity. As
a public order of human dignity on the widest possible scale is our goal,
little more need be said here.
Then there is the cornerstone of enlightenment,205 “mass media,
research.”
Education is quickly added here, as a value and a prime exemplar
of the practice of that dimension of human existence that Mac and his
colleague labeled enlightenment.

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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XVIII. EPILOGUE
One of the more interesting activities within the world of education--over the last half century, at least---has been the search for substantial
alternatives beyond traditional PK-12 public schools. Background realities
have included goals set forth in Mississippi’s early constitutions, on the
aspirational end, and more recent compulsory school attendance laws, on
the coercive end. The centerpiece cry increasingly heard has been
“Choice!” Less overt but nonetheless real is “Fear.”
And so, we wrap this exposition up with the complementary
comments of several of our country’s more thoughtful citizens of
generations past, words as powerful and meaningful in today’s context as
when first uttered.
“But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas---that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the marketplace.”206
But, as noted above, there is also “fear” in the marketplace, as much
as many might wish it otherwise. And so it is time for reflecting upon
Franklin Roosevelt’s wise advice to our country in the early days of the
Great Depression, that “the only thing we have to fear is---fear itself!”207
Before Brown and since Alexander, our greatest and most prevalent fear has
been racial desegregation in public education, though African-Americans
make up only 38 percent of the state’s population. The practical problem
is that for so long so many have insisted on such a super-majority of white
classmates for their children, with white flight the consequence of these
parents not getting their way. Of course, this one is coupled with the fact
that public school teacher salaries remain unfortunately, if not criminally,
low. People fear taxes necessary that MAEP be fully funded in the selfish
sense that no one likes paying taxes very much.
Fear is at the cornerstone of the religious issues discussed above.
This seems odd, as the fearful ones are our less tolerant – some might with
merit say, less than Christian -- Christians, whose religion remains by far
the most predominant in the state. Objections to LGBTQ students in our
schools are also grounded in fear. Again, why not Live and Let Live?
And in the context of what seems our second greatest fear--immigration---again, the battle scarred and thrice near fatally wounded
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., regarding a female pacifist’s application for
206. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
207. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (1933).
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citizenship, reflected
And recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant’s way, I
would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to
make this country what it is, . . . , and that I had not supposed
hitherto that we regretted our inability to expel them because
they believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the
Sermon on the Mount.208
Perhaps we should add these thoughts from Emma Lazurus, so associated
with our country’s Statue of Liberty.
Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses longing
to breathe free. The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, your tempest-tost to me. I will lift
my lamp beside the golden door.209
And teach all of these wise words to our children and their grandchildren.
Respectfully, history teaches that the foregoing insights are valuable
in understanding our state’s efforts at educating its people---and
particularly its children---from 1817, through the recent past, and for the
foreseeable future.

208. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
209. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883; 1903).

